Thiago Montes Gabri¹
Contemporary conflicts have been increasingly characterized by the occurrence of military actions in an environment of uncertainty, making it difficult to identify the dominant adversary, regular or otherwise, both in war and non-war situations.
Still during the Cold War, the Soviet Army found that the future battlefield would be fragmented, with gaps between units, open flanks, and combat not only on the front line, but also across the entire battle space, according to Grau and Bartles (2022).
A situation similar to what is doctrinally already employed by the Brazilian Army (Figure 1).
It is a fact that the end of the 20th century presented a reduction in high-intensity armed conflicts, as seen in the recurrent military operations against insurgents in the Middle East and Africa.
But the Ukraine-Russia conflict brought interstate conflict back into the news, introducing us to contemporary large-scale combat operations.
The Russian BTG, as cited earlier, had been envisioned to cope with this, and should have the capability to perform deep attacks, enveloping and flanking maneuvers. After several design attempts, including during participation in battles, a unit-level organization with combat, combat support, and logistical elements was arrived at.
This formation is aimed at conducting decentralized offensive and defensive military operations. According to Baez (2022), the BTG was put to the test in 2008 with the first deployment on the border with the Republic of Georgia. One can see a dissimilarity to the Land Force’s doctrinal employment in conventional combat, which is based on the brigade as the primary combined arms element.
Comprising Russia’s readiness system, this structure allows brigades to maintain better trained and rapidly readied units able to conduct ground combat in the early period of the war while the rest of the force is being mobilized to prepare for battle, characteristics explored by Ferreira (2022).
There is a similarity to the Army’s Strategic Employment Concept (EB70-D-10.002), where, similarly to our doctrine, it can be stated that the BTG would be able to be employed within the context of the “Extended Role” concept, similar to the purpose of FORPRON within the EB.
“… the desired operational readiness should be understood as a situation in which selected troops, trained and certified, will remain in a position to, when activated, assemble, get ready and move to a defined area of action within a time limit to be determined by COTER, through the Employment System.” (BRAZIL, 2019) (emphasis added)
Similarly, the Brazilian Army adopted several initiatives from the 2010s on, until the implementation of the Land Force Operational Readiness System (SISPRON), aiming to compose an Army Division, as presented by Soares (2021), composed of Light, Medium, and Heavy brigades. The Bld (Heavy) Brigade is composed of 01 FT U Bld/6th Bld Inf Bld, 01 FT U Bld/5th Bld C Bld, and the necessary Elm Ap to compose the Operational Capabilities to support this GU/FORPRON.
According to Ferreira (2022), in times of peace, the means do not remain gathered in a single barracks, but dispersed in the units that make up the G Cmdo and GU of the Russian Army, similar to what occurs today with the Operational Readiness Forces (FORPRON) of the Brazilian Army. Its structure, following the approach taken by Ferreira (2022), is based on a military organization of combined arms, in a semi-permanent character, kept in operational readiness and planned to be integrated by professional soldiers.
In short, it is a task force of unit value, of flexible composition, with personnel varying between 700 and 900 soldiers, with about 100 armored vehicles. Its characteristics are very close to the concept foreseen in the FORPRON Guidelines.
… Cmdo and EM of GU, a Tr value U, composed of 3 (three) SU of the base weapon, plus a command and support SU (C Ap). (…) should be added the Ap Cmb and Ap Log [complementary modules (Modul Compl)] proportional to the Ef of an OM. (…) Bia O, Seç AAAe, Cia E, Command and Control Modul (C2) and Modul Log.” (BRAZIL, 2021) (emphasis added)
“The Cmt U FORPRON will remain in the Cmdo of this until the end of the Ci Pron and will use his MS for the Plj and the Exec of the Adm Op Atv of the temporary U (Tmpr).” (BRAZIL, 2021) (emphasis added)
“The effectives to be selected to compose the FORPRON shall be composed exclusively of military personnel from the Professional Effectives (PE).” (BRASIL, 2019) (emphasis added)
To enable a relative structural comparison between the Russian BTG and the Brazilian FORPRON, the table below follows:
In order to synthesize the information, and punctuate the main similarities and differences in the structure of these two forces, aspects within the operational capabilities will be explored.
Fire Support
As for the fire support means, according to Souza Filho (2022), Figure 2 shows that the BTG has a wide versatility, being able to engage a wide variety of fires, allowing it to engage targets with Mrt P 120 mm up to 13 km, 152 mm tube artillery up to 30 km, 122 mm rocket artillery up to 21 km, and with 300 mm rockets up to 90 km.
In a different way, the FORPRON has a restricted capability, relying only on the Mrt P 120mm up to 12 km and the 155mm tube artillery up to 20 km in the case of the FORPRON/Bld. If the Specialized Module of the 6th GMF is integrated, it is possible to engage targets up to 80 km away.
This diversity of the BTG artillery generates consequences for the C³, considering the coordination of this wide fire support system, with three batteries of distinct characteristics: heavy mortars, self-propelled shells and multiple rocket launchers, according to Ferreira (2022).
This is not the case in the FORPRON, since the Mrt P squad is subordinated to the FT Bld, and has dedicated C³ resources, as well as the Bia O AP, with its organic structure, and the C³ Module to enable the actions of the Fire Support Coordinator (CAF). It is worth mentioning that, as Souza Filho (2022) warns, the Russian Armed Forces have fewer political and humanitarian “constraints” in relation to the Armed Forces of Western countries.
Because of this, it is easier for the Russians to decentralize artillery resources and, consequently, to renounce the direct control of the higher echelons in the use of rocket launchers.
Cyber and Electronic Warfare
Given that the flexible design of the BTG enables the integration of a range of capabilities, some sources in the references present GE or Cyber Warfare capabilities subordinated to this structure in analyses of the current conflict in Ukraine, although the example organizational structure in Figure 2, taken as the basis of this article, is not. Similarly, although there are conditions for integrating Specialized Modules in SISPRON with these capabilities (CDCiber, 1st BGE, and C2 Company), the same situation of the studied BTG occurs in the basic composition of the means of the FORPRON.
Communications, Command and Control (C³)
The C³ resources of the BTG are centralized in the commando squad subordinated to the task force command, while the FORPRON (Figure 3) has in its organization 01 (one) C³ module, destined to establish communications among the elements of Cmb, Ap Cmb and Ap Log; besides 01 (one) commando squad subordinated to FT Bld, organic of SU C Ap. This demonstrates that there is a greater C³ capacity in the FORPRON.
As for the command unit, we can admit that all the fractions of the BTG are subordinated to the Cmdo of the base unit. On the other hand, the FORPRON has a different command relationship, with the FT Bld and the Elm Ap (Ap Cmb and Ap Log) subordinated to the General Staff of a Bda, which is the purpose of the certification of the ME of the 6th Inf Bld and 5th C Bld, during the Constructive Simulation in Phase No. 2 of the FORPRON Readiness Cycles.
Regarding the composition of the MS, there is little information about the composition of this structure in the BTGs, however, one dissimilarity to the Brazilian doctrine is that “In the Russian system, members of the tactical staff usually command the troops associated with their staff section” (GRAU and BARTLES, 2016). Parallel to this, it can be stated that the current basic organization of the EM/FORPRON, is also not adequate to efficiently exercise C³, in view of the breadth of capabilities possible to be integrated.
This requires the reinforcement of the Of Lig in the Special MS, enabling the coordination of the Specialized Modules. It is noteworthy that, in the Ukraine conflict, several challenges have been presented in the C³ tasks by commanders at all levels of the BTG.
In part, due to the low leadership reported in several articles, as well as the rigid centralization in the planning and control of actions, generating consequences on the morale of the troops and on the lack of initiative in subordinate elements, even leading to the desertion of factions at the front. The attention to these aspects grows in importance during the Readiness Cycle of the FORPRON, in all ranks.
Intelligence
As for the use of intelligence in the current conflict, Fox (2022) highlights the deficiencies in reconnaissance actions, a fact that made Russian armored columns easy targets for agile, well-equipped and motivated Ukrainian forces.
It remains to be seen, as the current conflict continues, what are the causes of this deficiency, although it can be inferred that the reduced C³ capability and the consequent reduced situational awareness are the main factors. With regard to FORPRON, in a context of employment with greater demand for intelligence, the F Ter will be able to integrate detachments of the Specialized Module of the 6th BIM to FORPRON, enhancing this capability to its combat power.
The use of SARP is becoming increasingly present in the execution of various combat missions. The extensive use of this means in recent conflicts, such as Nagorno-Karabakh (2020) and Ukraine, reinforces the urgency of meeting the demand for equipping the FORPRON fractions, according to the allocation provided in the QDM.
Logistics
The means destined to the logistic support of the BTG have an effective SU value focused on supply and maintenance tasks.
This situation differs from that of FORPRON, whose Logistics Module has a Transportation Detachment that is able to support the displacement of armored means, if necessary. Due to this, Toledo (2022) explores the great challenges faced by the BTGs in their ability to provide adequate conditions for the employment of armored means, either due to the deficient maintenance of the vehicles that remained stationary for a long period of time after the strategic concentration, or due to the inability to use contractors in the hostile area of the conflict, or due to the decision to abandon the damaged vehicles due to insufficient rescue vehicles in the Gp Maintenance.
With regard to the FORPRON, it can be admitted that the last aspect is a similar reality, since the current endowment of the Bld Bda is below that foreseen in QDM, restricting the ability to provide adequate support. Another obstacle that Toledo (2022) notes is the little logistical autonomy of the first echelon troops, reducing their ability to last in action, especially in the platoon and subunit echelons.
In the first 48 hours after the beginning of the Russian invasion, the fractions already had problems with lack of supplies, especially in relation to fuel. Seara (2022) points out that currently the FT SU Bld do not have enough water and fuel tanks to meet their demands.
One of the reasons for this lack of means is related to the fact that, over time, the Military Organizations (OM) needed to unload the specialized towed vehicles, and, on the other hand, they were not replaced. Still, regarding resupply by the BTG, it is verified that the convoys are largely poorly protected, due to the reduced number of means destined to the security of the columns of logistic vehicles and to the defense of the train areas, a fact explored by Toledo (2022).
When observing the composition of means of the Logistics Module of FORPRON, it is verified that there is no fraction destined for its self-defense, and it is up to the Cmdo Bda, when activated, to designate means for this purpose. A study should be conducted to evaluate the need to include an organic security fraction in its composition, similar to what the Cia Seg does in the ambit of the logistical battalions.
It can be inferred that the means of the BTG’s logistical support fraction are undersized for an ambitious structure, making it dependent on the logistical battalion of its brigade, a situation addressed by Baez (2022).
Maneuver (Infantry and Cavalry)
According to Chart 1, it can be seen that the total number of sub-units of the BTG and FORPRON are similar, but the amount of armored means is greater in the case of a quaternary FORPRON Bld, considering that the Brazilian Army platoons are composed of four Vtr Bld, while the Russian Army platoons have only three Vtr Bld.
An important aspect linked to this is that one must take into account, for the structuring of the FORPRON, the importance of landed infantry elements. This is evident, according to Poggio (2022), in the Russian Army by the employment of the BTGs with Marine platoons with three Battle Groups consisting of seven servicemen on average, which means that each VBC Fuz would have about four landed servicemen available, not including the VBC garrison consisting of three servicemen.
As a result of these reductions and manning problems, many Russian platoons sent to Ukraine are closer to the size of a Brazilian Army CG (nine men), and many Russian battalions are the size of a reinforced Marine company.
By employing minimal infantry, the Marine battalions are suffering from the same vulnerabilities as the CC regiments. The high ratio of armored vehicles, relative to the number of soldiers, may explain the large amount of means abandoned by Russian forces during the early part of the war.
The lack of organic Marine troops also helps explain the poor performance of many Russian CC units, which are vulnerable to ambushes by Ukrainian anti-tank teams with Javelin, NLAW and Stugna-P anti-tank weapons. In light of this, there is a big difference in the structuring of the BTG and FORPRON.
However, this fact highlights the importance that the FORPRON/Bda Bld (6th Bld Inf Bld and 5th Bld C Bld) must have a constitution with infantry troops adequate to the combat missions of a FT Bld. It is necessary to seek, preferably, a balanced integration with 02 (two) Cia Fuz Bld and 02 (two) Esqd CC.
Engineering
The basic constitution of the BTG’s engineering operative capability varies from a Platoon to an Engineering Company. Still, according to the tasks to be performed and the situation examination, the integration of Movement Support Detachments (OOD, Russian acronym), for mobility support in offensive actions, and Mobile Obstacle Detachments (POZ, Russian acronym), for countermobility support in defensive actions, can be established, according to Kosciureski (2022).
In the case of the OOD, the focus is on mobility tasks, similar to those fulfilled by the engineering fractions of the EB and, consequently, of FORPRON. This detachment requires great protection from the supported troops, as the armor of its vehicles is light. It has a Vtr Bld similar to the VBC Eng, with superior and more versatile capabilities: the VBE Eng BAT-2. Still regarding the OOD, this fraction can also be reinforced by elements of the SU Eng Mined Cmp Opening Platoon, as well as means of obstacle crossing.
As for POZ, Russian doctrine primarily employs minefields in a defensive, placing this counter-mobility fraction to reinforce flank security or as an anti-tank reserve. The Vtr of this fraction’s endowment are the VB Lç Mna GMZ-3 and the UMZ-3 (remote mine-throwing) System. The Russian counter-mobility capability is superior to the Brazilian FORPRON.
Regarding the structure of the engineering resources, it is important to highlight that the Cia E Cmb Bld of the FORPRON Bld has a flexible structure, being composed of “Cmdo, Cmdo Section, 01 (one) Pel E Cmb Bld and 01 (one) Pel Eqp Esp”, the latter equipped with the necessary resources for the tasks that the FT Bld/FORPRON will be required to perform (VBC Eng, VB Lç Pnt, Trsp C Agu Resources, among others).
Considering the ample use of armored means by both formations, the need to equip the Btl E Cmb Bld of the Bda Bld with the means foreseen in QDM grows in importance, enabling the efficient use of FORPRON.
Air Defense (DA Ae)
The BTG’s DA Ae means are composed of two elements, one being portable (MANPADS) and the other embarked (Bia AAAe AP). These fractions have had a great challenge to counter the effective employment of drones such as the Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB-2 over marching columns of Russian troops. On the other hand, the FORPRON/Bda Bld has in its composition of means only the Bia AAAe AP equipped with VBC DA Ae GEPARD 1A2, which provide an adequate capability, for the time being, in the face of the low altitude threat.
Conclusion
Verifying what was explored in the present article, we can affirm that the BTG has many differences in relation to the FORPRON/Bda Bld, mainly regarding its organizational structure and its purpose within the concept of employment foreseen in the Land Military Doctrine.
Regarding the structural aspect, it is important to emphasize that the FORPRON, in the context of SISPRON, are able to constitute a Bda Bld, with the possibility of integrating Specialized Modules according to the operational capabilities required. In a different way, the BTG constitutes an integrated FT U Bld force with the necessary means to aggregate the required operational capabilities for the mission received.
As for the purpose, FORPRON does not aim to change the role of the brigade as the basic echelon to achieve the combined arms operations of the Brazilian Army, unlike the BTG, which is the basic module of employment in Russian doctrine for semi-independent military actions.
It is worth noting that exploring the use of the BTG in the current Ukrainian conflict reinforces the need to maintain the continuous preparation of the FORPRON, as well as the importance of equipping its fractions with the means, foreseen in QDM, critical to provide the necessary operational capabilities to achieve success in the missions received.
Finally, the war in Ukraine has become an ample source of data regarding the use of operational capabilities, given the uninterrupted coverage by social and mass media, allowing for constant analysis by specialists and military think tanks, generating opportunities for the evolution of current Brazilian land military doctrine.
Notes:
[1] Major of Infantry, Adjunct of the Operations Section of the 6th Bda Inf Bld.
[4] Maneuver (Inf and Cav), Fire Support, Air Defense, Engineering, C³ (Communications, Command and Control), Logistics, Aeromobility, Special Operations, Electronic Warfare, Cybernetic, Intelligence, Social Communication, Psychological Operations, CBRN and Civil Affairs. Aspects employed by the Ex C Dout, however, will not be explored in their entirety in this article.
[5] Operational Readiness System (SISPRON)
[6] “At the tactical level, this system allows these units to have smaller Stad-Major compared to Western units” (GRAUS and BARTLE, 2016)
[7] In its eighth month in mid-October 2022.
[8] The Russian Army has reduced the amount of support fractions in maintenance at the expense of gradually increasing elements of Contracted Civil Logistics Support (Contractors)
[9] It should be noted that Russia is not a signatory to the Ottawa Convention
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*** Translated by the DEFCONPress FYI Team ***