Ukraine claims to have sunk yet another Russian warship. If on the land front the Ukrainians have no results to celebrate, in the Black Sea the situation is quite different.
(DW) The Russian landing ship Caesar Kunikov had already been through several battles, such as in the Georgian War in 2008 and later off the coast of Syria. But last Wednesday night (14/02), this 112-meter-long vessel was sunk by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the Crimean peninsula, the Ukrainian military announced. Ukrainian secret services released videos showing an explosion followed by a large fire on board.
This is by no means the first time that Ukraine has reported a military success in the Black Sea. If the land fronts have been stagnating for over a year – with no significant progress on either side – in the Black Sea the Ukrainian military has managed to break the hold of the Russian Navy.
This is in stark contrast to the situation in the early days of the Russian-initiated war. Numerically, the Russian fleet in the Black Sea is far superior to the Ukrainian one. Soon after the outbreak of the war, in February 2022, the Russian military blockaded Ukrainian ports and captured the strategically important Snake Island off the Romanian coast. They also laid numerous sea mines. From the south, Ukraine seemed isolated from the world.
But little by little, the Ukrainians managed to free themselves from the Russian siege at sea. As early as April 2022, the Ukrainian army sank the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva. In June, it retook Snake Island. It repeatedly attacked Russian ships, ports and supply routes. In July 2023, it seriously damaged the Crimean bridge linking the annexed peninsula to mainland Russia.
In October 2023, the Russian Navy was forced to withdraw most of its fleet from Sevastopol to the eastern part of the Black Sea. But even there its warships are not always safe. Even in the port of Novorossiisk, more than 300 kilometers east of Sevastopol, Ukraine managed to seriously damage a landing ship.
The Ukrainian actions “show that the Russians cannot defend themselves well against Ukrainian naval artillery and drones,” analyzes Eurasia expert Stephan Blank of the Washington-based Foreign Policy Research Institute. “What’s more, they don’t seem to be up to the threat that Ukraine poses to them.”
Russia has lost about 40% of its tonnage in the Black Sea since February 2022, said former US Marine Colonel Mark Cancian, who is a consultant for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in an article for Foreign Affairs magazine.
Unusual combination of armaments
According to Cancian, Ukraine achieved this result with an unusual combination of different weapons. On the one hand, it relied on anti-ship missiles with a range of up to 200 kilometers – partly produced by itself, partly supplied by Western allies. These missiles were initially designed to be fired from the sea, but the Ukrainian military modified them so that they could be fired from protected positions on land, making them less vulnerable to counterattacks.
Another type of long-range missile supplied by Western countries is actually designed to attack static targets on land and not for firing at moving targets at sea. However, Ukraine has used it effectively to hit not only port facilities, logistics centers and supply depots in Crimea, but also warships anchored in Russian ports.
Kiev is also relying on naval drones – small unmanned craft equipped with explosives that are difficult to detect. These drones would have a range of 800 kilometers. They are controlled remotely by a video camera, are very flexible in use, can dodge counter-attacks and can also quickly change targets.
Ukraine manufactures most of these naval drones, of the Magura V5 type. It continuously improved them throughout the war and can now produce them in series. These drones are usually used in groups, so-called drone swarms, which makes defense even more difficult.
With this unusual combination of weaponry, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have already destroyed or seriously damaged two Russian frigates, five landing ships and a submarine, as well as the Moskva, says Cancian.
Results of strategic importance
These remarkable results by the Ukrainian military have provided a remarkable relief in many respects. Especially at the beginning of the war, there was fear of Russian landing maneuvers in the Odessa region – today, Ukraine is mostly able to keep Russian ships out of the western part of the Black Sea. “This also makes it more difficult for Russia to maintain the logistical capabilities of its Armed Forces in southern Ukraine,” analyzes Eurasia expert Stephan Blank. The Ukrainian army, for its part, was able to move many soldiers who had been sent to protect Ukraine’s southern coast to the eastern front.
The consequences could also be felt in Ukraine’s grain exports. It was with great difficulty that the UN managed, in July 2022, to broker a grain deal that lifted the Russian naval blockade and allowed limited Ukrainian exports across the Black Sea from ports in the Odessa region. However, after just 12 months, Russia withdrew from the agreement and threatened to attack merchant ships if they continued to call at Ukraine.
This threat never materialized. Although in the meantime Ukraine has transferred part of its food exports to rail transport, it has also resumed exports via the Black Sea through the ports of Constanta and Istanbul – since December 2023, these exports have reached a volume even greater than at the time of the UN trade agreement.
The situation on the Black Sea alone will not lead Ukraine to military victory, as the front on land is stagnating. But, as Cancian analyzes, the naval results give Ukraine a slightly better negotiating position if peace talks with Russia take place at some point.
*** Translated by DEFCONPress FYI Team ***