How the Wagner Group's rebellion is viewed in RussiaA woman with a dog walks past a tank as fighters of Wagner private mercenary group are deployed in a street near the headquarters of the Southern Military District in the city of Rostov-on-Don, Russia, June 24, 2023. A sign on a tank reads: "Siberia". REUTERS/Stringer

Revolt by Wagner Group leader generates fear and insecurity. State press tries to explain how the leader of the rebellious militia went from traitor to amnesty.

(DW) Last weekend, many residents of southern Russia received desperate appeals from relatives in other regions of the country. “Get your things and come here as soon as possible!” was a common request.

Because of its proximity to Ukraine, the situation in southern Russia has been tense since the start of the war. Last weekend it got even worse.

This time, however, the danger came from the Russian side, or rather from the paramilitary militia known as the Wagner Group and headed by an ally of President Vladimir Putin, Yevgeny Prigozhin.

“Treason is a crime in times of war”

“My neighbor received a call from her daughter from the Ural Mountains: ‘Mom, you can’t stay in Rostov anymore, come here,'” a woman reported to DW from Rostov, a city that was taken over by the Wagner Group.

But not only there was fear and insecurity. Fear because no one could tell how far the militia would go. The news that it was already 200km from Moscow soon spread, and the mayor of the capital advised residents to leave the city.

Insecurity because Prigozhin, until recently deified by the entire state press, was, a few hours later, demonized by that same press.

“Armed mutiny in Russia, without popular support! Treason in times of war is a serious crime!”: this is how presenter Dmitri Kiselev began his evening news on the Rossia radio station on the first day of the rebellion. Days later, faced with images of retreating tanks, he would say: “Fratricidal war could be avoided.

Losses among the Russian military

Kiselev tried to present the agreement that sealed the end of the mutiny as a victory for the Kremlin, arguing that everything could have been much worse and that the “great bloodshed” could be avoided.

He gave little emphasis to the deaths of ten Russian soldiers by Prigozhin’s militia.

What caused even more confusion was Prigozhin’s acquittal. Only a few days ago called a “traitor” who would “answer for what he did,” the militia chief was now a free man who would not be punished at all. All charges against him have been dropped, Russian news agency RIA reported.

Declaration of state bankruptcy

This situation forced the Russian state media to once again clarify the situation for its already confused audience. The head of the RT broadcaster, Margarita Simonjan, tried with these words: “Legal norms are not commandments of Christ or the Tablets of the Law of Moses. They are written by people to ensure order and stability in the country. But if in a critical situation of exception, they fail to fulfill their function, and even produce the opposite effect, then… to hell with them!”.

For Russian philosopher Denis Grekov, this statement is nothing more than a declaration of the bankruptcy of the Russian state. “A state that no longer has a monopoly on violence or in which power is no longer unified, where legal norms are no longer valid, is basically no longer a state,” he notes.

The propaganda researcher Maria Borsunova summarizes the statement like this: “Simonjan tried to explain that the Russian legal and penal system is needs-oriented. If necessary, a criminal case can be opened one day and closed the next, it depends on what is needed at the moment.”

“Patriotic public opinion”

Grekov assesses that so-called “patriotic public opinion” will continue to express admiration for Prigozhin. The actions of the paramilitary leader, whose soldiers took the city of Bakhmut after months of heavy fighting, continue to be celebrated as a heroic act in the Russian propaganda press.

Grekov adds that also among the Russian military there is much admiration for the leader of the Wagner Group. Many are disappointed with Defense Minister Serguei Shoigu.

In 2024 there will be elections in Russia. A candidacy by Prigozhin, who is attributed political ambitions, is more doubtful than ever after the rebellion. Putin, on the other hand, has never ruled out that he will run. At least for the time being.

How the Wagner Group’s mutiny resonated in Latin America

In most of Latin America, the news that the Wagner Group of mercenaries led by Yevgeny Prigozhin was headed to Moscow in tanks seems to have generated surprise and confusion, but not astonishment.

According to Mauricio Jaramillo, a professor of political science at Colombia’s Rosario University, there has been much speculation for two reasons. “Firstly because, in general terms, the position of the states, with the exception of Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, has been one of neutrality. And secondly: there is a lot of expectation, but little reliable information. A lot of false or inaccurate news is circulated,” he says.

“The problem with the Latin American media is that they have a very weak international line,” he says, pointing out that, thus, “many, at the moment of crisis, publish a lot of news in a prolific way and, once [the crisis] is stopped, they stop informing.” The crises and problems of each country occupy the headlines, and the public seems to be left without the follow-up and the deepening of the facts, Jaramillo stresses.

Regarding the war in Ukraine, the professor criticizes the fact that some Latin American media outlets are “olimpically” unaware of the principle of neutrality that has been in force in the region for decades. Some seem to have forgotten the lesson of the Cold War, when Latin American countries were treated as “tokens” in a foreign geopolitical game.

For this reason, the president of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, would have refused to hand over to the United States military equipment destined for Ukraine, “a reaction that was respected by the Joe Biden administration and that did not damage relations at all,” Jaramillo reinforces. In relation to the rest of the region, he points out that “because they are not affiliated to NATO, the Latin American countries cannot be classified as pro-Russian.

Dependence on Russia is a risk for Venezuela

The regimes in Caracas, Havana and Managua were the only Latin American countries to back Russian leader Vladimir Putin on Twitter. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil posted a statement rejecting “armed insurrection, through terrorist methods. The president of Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel, expressed conviction that in Russia “constitutional order will prevail.” And Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega and his vice president, Rosario Murrillo, expressed solidarity “in the face of the challenge to Russia’s wisdom and forces.”

The Venezuelan government was the first to express support for Moscow. On how much Caracas depends on Russia, from where it gets arms, Carlos Blanco, former president of Venezuela’s Presidential Commission for State Reform, explains: “[Presidents Hugo] Chávez and [Nicolás] Maduro changed the strategic pattern of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, whose fundamental mission was the defense of national sovereignty and territory. This change in strategic approach was aimed at possibly confronting an ‘empire’ – that is, the United States – and defending against an eventual military incursion, which would take place through Colombia.”

Venezuela is considered the largest buyer of Russian weaponry in Latin America, having already received more than 100,000 Kalashnikov AK-103s, as well as tanks, fighter planes, military helicopters and anti-aircraft systems. In 2019, the extent of this military-technical cooperation was estimated at $11 billion. According to the German newspaper Wirtschaftswoche, Russia has provided loans for this purpose.

Moreover, on March 30, 2021, during the visit of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, Caracas closed 12 agreements in the fields of finance, energy, food, trade, military, food and health. And, according to documentation obtained by the Spanish daily Nius, both the Venezuelan Executive and the state-owned oil company PDVSA would hold accounts at the Russian bank Evrofinance Mosnarbank.

For Blanco, who works as a consultant to the European Union, “what is happening in Russia, from the invasion of Ukraine and the processes of discontent of citizens and the military, is evident,” and “these waves of unrest and instability in Russia are worrying for a regime like Maduro’s, which is basically sustained by these international alliances. But what once applied to the U.S. holds true today for Moscow: “Any Russian sneeze can provoke a strong bronchitis in the Venezuelan government.”

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