Colonel R1 Marcelo Oliveira Lopes Serrano
To think critically is to weigh up facts and circumstances in order to form a judgment about the true condition of the object being thought about. It is based on the rational and impartial study of evidence. It must be exercised conscientiously and autonomously, because in order to be critical, thinking needs to be independent and regularly fed back. It presupposes the pursuit of higher degrees of excellence, needs to be convincing in its arguments and positively skeptical of usual standards and procedures. It must not allow itself to be influenced by self-centeredness or the exclusivism and presumptions of specific groups. It is characterized by being objective, pragmatic, free of cultural dogmas, which requires rowing against the tide in many situations, and its exercise depends on predisposition.
This way of thinking is not spontaneous. It needs to be motivated, because the force of habit and routines have the negative power to encourage intellectual inertia or apathy, and personal or organizational pride in achievements can generate empathy with the results achieved, giving the impression, which is not always true, of unimpeachable practices. The absence of pressure to be effective can remove reflective concern, creating a feeling of accommodation, since the inconvenience of delaying recommended measures is not clearly shown in this case. Superficial or peripheral changes can suggest an organization that is flexible to change, an understanding that is partially false if the core of the organization is excluded from the reflective process.
Certain generic dysfunctions that reduce organizational efficiency can occur, especially in culturally conservative organizations, and can occasionally go unnoticed,
Satisfied accommodation, the distortion of conservative practice, leads people to be more concerned with processes or means of execution than with the necessary ends; it detracts from the sense of effectiveness and, through uncritical acceptance, favors acquiescence with customary practices. As a result, people fail to notice any needs, to modify attitudes or procedures, except for peripheral or specific issues, and fail to observe deficiencies and inadequacies that affect the organization in a broad and profound way.
Being oblivious to the fact that the dynamics of circumstances can make what was once a solution inconvenient or turn it into a new problem generates an inability to think critically, a certain inertia or unwillingness to think objectively and deeply about basic organizational issues.
Excessive attachment to or respect for established practices, facilitated by the absence of pressure to highlight shortcomings, can lead to this inappetence. This leads to a lack of genuinely new ideas, which results in an effort to maintain organizational dynamism by compensating for this reflective deficit with the expectation of incorporating advances conceived by other organizations, especially foreign ones. This expectation, however, will not be entirely satisfactory if it is judged that these advances are directly applicable, that certain peculiarities of the organization do not prevent them from producing the same effects.
This incorporation of improvements is beneficial¹, but if it is not accompanied by critical thinking, it simply becomes accumulative, superimposing a new layer on the previous ones, in a process of sedimentation, but not necessarily integration: just as ponds and deserts are unsuitable for planting – they require drainage or irrigation to become productive – organizational structures and practices may not fit well with the incorporated advance, preventing it from extracting its full potential. Innovation efforts without critical thinking result in merely accumulative advances.
A focus on processes and means and an uncritical attitude towards routine or crystallized practices require critical thinking. The first consists of concealing the real problems or objectives, while preserving a sense of action, but action that is not very fruitful, concentrated on processes and, therefore, has low productivity or is even ineffective in many cases. The second is inattention to critically assessing circumstances. Causes of these dysfunctions include excessive respect for the decisions and actions of former bosses, which are considered established practices and values in themselves, inhibition or fear of pointing out errors or inconveniences that displease current bosses, and a lack of critical vision, resulting from not exercising it. Lack of courage can be part of these causes, because “courage also consists of knowing how to oppose opinions, when appropriate, and to state your disagreement” (HUDE, Henri, The Ethics of the Decision Maker, Bibliex).
The possibility of these dysfunctions occurring indicates the necessary precaution against a lack of objectivity and against passivity in the face of any shortcomings in customary practices. Organizations need to remain open to the free discussion of issues related to them and understand that “intellectual courage also consists in not fearing the effect of certain discontents” (Ibidem).
Freedom of discussion can be distorted to cover up conformism if it is practiced so closely as to turn it into a “cunning procedure” that disqualifies dissenting thought from debate on the grounds of its supposed unreasonableness (Ibidem).
Collective opinions have a considerable degree of authority, but they are no guarantee of veracity or convenience, because they are not true because they are collective, and the lure of consensus can induce a posture of tacit consent, of “convenient silence”, which is conducive to riding the timid wave of careerist concern (Ibidem).
A sense of reality is essential: “the worst derangement of the spirit is to see things as you want them to be and not as they are […] To have a sense of reality is to distrust prefabricated formulas. […] typical of bureaucrats” (COURTOIS, Gaston, The Art of Being a Boss, Bibliex). This sense, like any human capacity, needs to be exercised, otherwise it will wither away.
On one occasion, a Squadron Mechanized Cavalry commander asked his officers and sergeants what they imagined when they thought of their squadron. The answer was invariable: they imagined the barracks. This unanimity highlighted the deviation in their way of thinking, because it was based on the subunit’s real estate, a mere means of housing it administratively, and not on its purpose: the structured set of personnel, vehicles, weapons and equipment intended for a specific type of operational use. Those military personnel were subjectively more inclined to focus on processes and means and, consequently, had little inclination for truly critical thinking.
At the beginning of this century, the Management Excellence Program, the most concrete example, made the same mistake of focusing on process. It basically sought to bureaucratically adapt military organizations to the theoretical standards of management science, instead of using good management standards to identify and correct deficiencies. The gains made were small compared to the energy expended and what could have been gained if the focus had been on the end. Management is a tool and the tool itself has been attributed the ability to correct defects because of its presumed existence, but it would only be productive to the extent that it was properly used.
Past examples say nothing about the Army’s current condition, but they are useful as a warning that it is not free from suffering similar dysfunctions if it lacks objectivity and critical thinking.
Also dysfunctional is the tendency to appreciate personal and organizational performance in a predominantly laudatory way.² Although pleasant, expressions of praise do not always express true devotion. Errors and shortcomings, which are never absent, are not self-correcting; if they are not recognized and pointed out, the result will always be harmful. This feeds a mistaken and dangerous illusion of excellence greater than that which actually exists.
Frank, objective and well-intentioned criticism shows genuine concern and zeal for the object being criticized and can prevent mistakes. They do not violate discipline – discipline demands obedience, not agreement – nor do they constitute impertinence or transgression if they are directed at the sphere of action of higher echelons, as long as they have the training to do so, because there is no indiscipline in frank manifestations of a functional nature. However, those who do so need to remain disciplined, because the fruit of their thinking does not impose itself on the decision-maker; it is only up to them to point out the problematic aspects to the decision-maker.
Improving the Army requires constant effort. The successful accomplishment of its missions depends on the precision with which its objectives are defined, the synergy with which its organizations work, the effectiveness of its resources, the relevance of its internal procedures and the flexibility of its cultural traits. Its efficiency rests above all on the perspicacity of its personnel in examining the prevailing circumstances, perceiving the problematic aspects and devising appropriate solutions. Dysfunctions in thinking and judgment have a negative impact on the efficiency of the Force and deserve constant attention and, if necessary, correction.
“It is less difficult to create an institution than it is to keep it in good working order, because life is something so mobile that its conceptions must be constantly renewed in order to adapt them to the new conditions of circumstances and people” (Ibidem).
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¹Don’t confuse learning from the experience of others with a mere spirit of imitation.
²At a study meeting with ECEME instructors who had served in Haiti, after everyone had highlighted the successes of the Brazilian troops, the S Cmt asked what had gone wrong. Silence. Silence again after the question was repeated, until one of them pointed out the faults, but committed by a foreign troop.
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About the author:
Marcelo Oliveira Lopes Serrano, cavalry colonel, graduated from the Agulhas Negras Military Academy in 1977. He attended EsAO in 1986 and ECEME in 1993-94. He was a trainee at the Collège Interarmées de Défense in Paris, France, in 1997-98. He served as deputy of the 2nd Section of the Amazon Military Command and of the Army Attaché at the Brazilian Embassy in the United States.
He commanded the 3rd Squadron Mechanized Cavalry and the 3rd Combat Car Regiment. Transferred to the reserve in August 2008, his last active duty position was deputy commander of the Army Command and General Staff School.
*** Translated by iDEFCONPress FYI Team ****