Col Flábio
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a war between two countries that were once allies and former members of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The current conflict began its warlike phase on February 24, 2022, with the invasion of Ukrainian territory by Russian troops from Belarus. In almost two years of war, or according to the Russian narrative, “Russian special operation in Ukraine”, it has been possible to notice many movements of troops expanding and retracting, but with many actions in the informational dimension, in search of controlling narratives and achieving objectives in this dimension of the operational environment.
Non-kinetic actions fought in an informational dimension in a war or warlike conflict are nothing new. These actions have always been observed, but an important turning point was the “live” broadcast of the conflict in Kuwait in 1991, a situation that revolutionized actions in the informational dimension, as millions of people around the world began to have contact with direct information about the conflicts, which became known as the “CNN effect”.
With the advent of social networks and media, the information dimension of warfare has taken on a leading role that had not existed before. The use of information warfare cannot be neglected in today’s conflicts, acting from the time of normality and continuing, on the same scale, in the aggravation of the conflict until the use of warfare.
Information Warfare actions in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are already being considered the most intense of all the conflicts studied. The extensive use of Information Operations by both sides is being followed more closely, as our access to information has been increased by the internet, social networks and social media, accessing primary sources through official posts or secondary sources through replies or comments.
Russia’s role in the information dimension has been very clear, although not explicit. The dissemination of information disorder is common practice for the Russians, mainly in pursuit of their political goals.
Russia operates social networks in a peculiar way, as it censors internal users and massively disseminates its propaganda on these platforms. Facebook and Twitter are both banned within Russia’s borders, but Russian propaganda and disinformation aimed at foreign audiences still flourishes on these platforms. In Russia, YouTube and TikTok are still accessible to ordinary citizens, but are heavily censored. Instead, the country has some social networks of its own, under the control of the central government. The most popular social media platform used in Russia is VKontakte (VK), but Telegram (widely used in Brazil) and Yandex are also prominent. This censorship measure has boosted domestic Russian propaganda and blocked anti-Russian propaganda for the country’s domestic audience.
Russia has adopted a stance of defending its interests and its population, both inside and outside its territory. To legitimize his “Special Military Operation”, Putin has declared the need for the “denazification” of Ukraine, accusing Zelensky of persecuting and massacring the Ukrainian population of Russian origin, invoking values that are still deeply rooted in the world’s population, due to the holocaust promoted by the German Nazis. Another narrative employed by the Russians in the media is to discredit the actions that NATO has carried out in recent years, in a clear attempt to disqualify the organization and retract its actions due to the lack of legitimacy of any military use in the conflict. A third aspect of Moscow’s media strategy is to minimize the impact of the conflict, both in Russia and in Ukraine, so as not to shock domestic and foreign public opinion with the harshness of the clashes.
On the Ukrainian side, Zelensky conducts his information activities in search of internal and external support for the conflict. There is clearly an external priority in Ukrainian publications, seeking political and military support for the war, raising concern in European countries about the consequences that Europe is suffering and will suffer under the threat of an invading Russia. Another narrative undertaken by Kiev is the “demonization” of Putin’s personal and political figure, in a clear move to discredit the Russian leader and his decisions. A third and very important image created by Ukraine’s informational actions is that of the heroic figure of Zelensky, who refused to flee and continues to lead the country, generating confidence among his domestic audience.
The Western perception of the news coverage of the conflict has been very active and important in shaping international public opinion. With a bias in favor of the Ukrainians, it disseminates facts that lead to the creation of an image that Putin is an unbalanced dictator, while Zelensky is a hero of the Ukrainian resistance.
Russia is clearly demonstrating that it is part of its military doctrine to use information on a massive scale, corroborating the use of its military forces on the battlefield. It has used this doctrine for decades and does so under the justification that the ends (political objectives) justify the means employed.
Ukraine’s use of this doctrine is less systematic, but over the course of the conflict it has felt the positive effects of the coordinated and planned informational dimension, benefiting even more than Russia.
The current Russian-Ukrainian conflict gives rise to reflections on the informational dimension. The first is knowing that there can no longer be military warfare without the support of informational actions, that is, not only knowing how to use them, but above all, knowing how to defend against them, because the quote from the playwright Aeschylus is so relevant when he says that “In war, truth is the first victim”.
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About the Author:
Col. FLÁBIO is an Infantry Officer who graduated from the Agulhas Negras Military Academy in 1998. He attended the Officer Training School in 2006, the Army Command and Staff Course in 2017, the Joint Staff Course at the War College in 2019 and the High Defense Studies Course at the Defense College in 2023. He also has a specialization in Corporate Strategic Management from the Catholic University of Brasilia. He was Intelligence and Operations Officer of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Brigade in Cristalina – GO and Head of the Intelligence Agency of the Planalto Military Command. He is currently Head of the Doctrine and Operations Section of the Army’s Social Communication Center.
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*** Translated by DEFCONPress FYI Team ***