The repercussions of the conflict in Eastern Europe are also being felt on African soil. Moscow and Kiev are involved in Sudan. Mali and Niger have broken off diplomatic relations with the Ukrainians. War by proxy?
(DW) At first glance, it seems clear: on the yellow sands of the Malian semi-desert, Tuareg fighters and their supporters pose for a victory photo. Right next to the flag of the Tuareg separatist militia, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azauad (MLNA), flies the yellow and blue flag of Ukraine.
Behind it, a message: the Ukrainians had taken part in an ambush in which many Russian mercenaries and Malian army soldiers died. A representative of the Ukrainian military intelligence service HUR also made a statement to this effect.
In reaction, on August 4 the ruling military junta in Mali broke off diplomatic relations with Ukraine. Its example was followed by neighboring Niger three days later.
Kiev countered: its Foreign Ministry demanded that the Malian government provide proof of involvement before taking such a step.
Experts also doubt this version of the story. “I don’t believe that Ukraine played a role in this,” says Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, linked to Germany’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party.
“Ukraine knows northern Mali very well, because it had a lot of helicopter pilots in the Minusma peacekeeping mission, which was closed down. But I can’t imagine what added value Ukraine can offer the Tuareg rebels, who know their own region best.”
The failure of the Russian mercenaries, confirmed by all sides – who were supposed to improve the security situation in the Sahel on behalf of the military junta – as well as Ukraine’s unclear role in all this, highlights the question: to what extent are Russia and Ukraine fighting proxy wars on African soil?
Which narrative benefits whom?
Ukrainian security analyst Iliya Kusa doesn’t believe his country is involved in the events in Tinzaouatène in northern Mali either. Rather, he detects the Russian media’s efforts to promote this version of the story.
“They used the fact to talk about Ukrainian involvement, because this is an opportune narrative for Russia,” says the expert from the Kiev Institute for the Future. They can use it to convince African countries that Ukraine is evil and not a constructive partner.” Kusa believes that Russia may also be using this argument to expand its military presence in the Sahel.
Irina Filatova, a Russian historian at the University of Cape Town in South Africa and professor emeritus at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, avoids making judgments based on the information available. But she believes that it is in Ukraine’s interest to be perceived as an involved party: “It wants to show African countries that Russia is not omnipotent and that it can also lose.”
But for Ulf Laessing, the damage to the country’s image is greater than any possible benefit: “Ukraine is not doing itself any favors by allying itself with the Tuareg rebels, who are historically associated with kidnappings, smuggling and links to jihadists.”
The Tuaregs are also highly unpopular in Mali’s capital – historically for making slaves from the south of the country, and currently because their advance on Timbuktu in 2012 triggered the security crisis that persists to this day.
Moscow on both sides in Sudan
Some 3,000 kilometers to the east, there is another bloody conflict that is often seen as a proxy war: in Sudan, the regular army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) special unit have been fighting for supremacy since April 2023.
Ukraine remains loyal to the army’s leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who had previously provided logistical and diplomatic support in the defense against the Russian invasion. Russia, for its part, initially sided with the RSF, under whose protection the Wagner mercenary group and other Russian actors operated lucrative gold mines.
However, Russia never consistently supports just one side, but always the one that best suits its interests, Filatova points out: it “also supports the central government, because it controls the coast, and Russia wants to establish a military base there”.
The fact that the fighting in Sudan is still going on with the same harshness almost 16 months after the start of the war is also due to the supply of arms by other regional powers, such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt.
Analyst Iliya Kusa doesn’t see Sudan as a top priority for Ukraine. “Our country has certainly developed an interest wherever Russia is present. The logic is this: if Russia is there, it could be interesting for us.”
Enemies in distant lands too
Perhaps this logic is also behind an incident recorded in a video published by the Ukrainian daily Kyiv Post in February: the brief clip shows three men kneeling on the ground, blindfolded and with their hands tied, during an alleged interrogation by Ukrainian special forces.
One of the prisoners claims to be a member of the Wagner mercenary group and to be in Sudan with orders to overthrow the government. Ukrainians and Russians as enemies, but not on the front line in the country under attack, but in faraway Sudan?
“The presence of both sides is so unequal that it’s difficult to talk about a proxy war,” Filatova analyzes. “It’s obvious that the Ukrainian special forces and military intelligence service are fighting Russia regardless of the location. Of course, it’s also important for Ukraine to fight the Russians in Africa, but without the goal of geopolitical hegemony, as Russia is pursuing.”
Jakkie Cilliers, founder and chairman of the board of the South African Institute for Security Studies, on the other hand, does see signs of proxy wars in Africa, but between Russia and the West as a whole: “I have the impression that they are confronting each other in Africa.”
He says he would be surprised if countries like the UK, France and the US weren’t operating there with advice, intelligence and possibly even target data for military action. “We’re only seeing the tip of the iceberg.”