Cap Inf MAICON SOUSA AVILA OVIEDO, 29th BIB
- INTRODUCTION
On February 20, 2022, Russia started its invasion of the Ukrainian territory, using modern means of ground, air and naval combat. In a maneuver that evoked a kind of engagement, Vladimir Putin’s army employed its armored means in combination with air-mobile troops, in what it believed would be a conflict of quick resolution, with a simple conquest over the fragile Ukrainian army. However, what was seen in reality was very different.
The rapid advance of the armored troops was hampered greatly by the judicious employment of an efficient Anti-Car Combat (AC), whose main actor was the exceptional Javelin gun, responsible for the slaughter of hundreds of Russian armored vehicles in this conflict.
Without a doubt, the monetary and financial support provided to Ukraine by several NATO countries, such as the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom, and Germany, was a preponderant factor in the Ukrainian effort to hinder the enemy advance. However, it was the combined use of this technology with light, medium, and heavy infantry troops that brought the current scenario to the conflict: Russian forces suffering heavy casualties and Ukrainian forces attacking and retaking strategically important territories.
It is this protagonism of AC means that will be addressed in this article, in which we analyze news and reports of their employment, in view of the fact that the conflict is still developing.
- THE EVOLUTION OF ANTI-TANK MEANS
Anti-Army Means (MAC) have been developed over the years, as the doctrine of employment of armored means and their integrated technologies have developed over the years. Since the first appearance of an armored fighting vehicle at the Battle of the Somme in 1916 in the context of World War I, the armies of the world, especially those involved in that conflict, began to develop increasingly sophisticated armaments to rebalance combat against the innovative and powerful war machines called then “War Tanks”.
The first AC weapon developed by Germany in 1918 was the Mauser 1918 Tankgewehr, a 13.22mm caliber repeating rifle aimed at piercing the fragile armor of the early “tanks.” Over the years, especially during World War II, new MACs were produced and put into use during armed conflicts.
The German Panzerfaust and Panzershrek are excellent examples of armaments that were successful in Anti-Army Defense (ACD) during World War II. However, it was with the onset of the Cold War and the improvements made to missile systems that DAC reached a new level. In this period, new technologies were added to existing AC weapon systems and thus, DAC became a major factor on battlefields around the world.
2.1 THE GENERATIONS OF ANTI-TANK MISSILES
2.1.1 – The First Generation At the beginning of the Cold War, the first generation of Anti Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) was born, called MACLOS (Manual Command Line of Sight).
Its system required the shooter to guide the munition to its impact with the target, keeping the munition within the crosshairs with the aid of a lever (Joystick), which represented a great disadvantage, leaving him excessively vulnerable during firing, as well as requiring intense and complex training. The SS.10 Nord Missile was the most prominent example of this generation, developed and produced in the 1950s.
2.1.2 – The Second Generation This generation was known for the SACLOS (Semi Automatic Command to Line of Sight) system. In this system, the shooter only needed to keep the sighting reticle on the target until impact and no longer guide the missile to it. The guidance worked through radio waves or wire systems. Easier to operate, these missiles still left the shooter vulnerable during the time between firing and impact on the target, making it easier for the enemy to respond. Developed in the 1970s, the US Helfire I missile was one of the key missiles of this generation.
2.1.3 – The Third Generation In this generation the “Fire and Forget” system became popular. This equipment is equipped with a targeting system capable of identifying the target and no longer requires guidance between the shot and the impact. Most ATGMs of this generation are easy to handle and provide the shooter with the security of being able to move away as soon as the shot is fired. Developed in the 1980s, the revolutionary American-made FGM-148 Javelin is the main model of this generation, as is the Israeli Spike LR.
2.1.4 – The Fourth Generation Updating the previous systems, the fourth generation became known by the term “Fire, Observe and Update”. The main innovation concerns the range of materials, which goes from 2500m in the previous generation to an astonishing 15000m to 20000m. In addition, this generation is characterized by the dual guidance system, employing an electro-optical thermal sensor and a millimeter-wave active radar tracker. The Indian NAG Missile (SANT) variant is the main exponent of this generation.
2.1.5 – The Fifth Generation Some of the most current ATGMs, such as the French Akeron MP and the new versions of SPIKE (LR2 and ER2) have been considered the new generation of MAC. Their main innovation lies in the use of artificial intelligence in the launchers and/or the missiles themselves, ushering in a generation of “smart weapons”.
2.2 THE LR2 SPIKE MISSILE
The SPIKE LR2 (Long Range) is a 5th generation missile, with electro-optical guidance, which can be launched by infantrymen or vehicles (multiplatform), can be integrated with Remotely Controlled Weapons Systems (SARC), and is in use in several countries.
As for the AC organizational structure, currently the Pel AC has different configurations, with the BI Mec a fraction with 03 (three) Seç Msl AC and the Bda Bld and L a fraction with 02 (two) Seç Msl AC. This requires a study to seek uniformity in the organizational structure of this fraction, similar to what was done in the design of the SU AC. The Gu Msl AC SPIKE is composed of three (3) men (commander, shooter, and munitions man) when operating disembarked. In armored and mechanized troops, the driver is added to this Gu with the qualifications pertaining to the type of appropriation vehicle.
2.3 DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT
In order to analyze the constitution of the Msl AC means in the Combat Elements of the Bda Bld, it is important to point out that these are employed in the form of Armored Task Forces (FT Bld) valor Unit. Considering that the combat power of FT Bld is in the employment of the SU Bld and the SU C Ap resources, we must consider the situation of the AC resources: First, when the command is from BIB, there will be 01 (one) organic AC unit, for the purpose of employment in the DAC of this FT Bld; Second, in the situation of FT RCC, the Cmt will only be able to employ 01 (one) Msl AC unit. It is worth mentioning that FT RCC has organically 01 (one) Seç CC in the Esqd C Ap, whose main function is to provide security to the CPs and to the movements of the FT RCC Cmt in its Z Aç.
Analyzing this situation, we can state that FT BIB is able to deny 02 (two) armored access ways, while FT RCC only denies the use of 01 (one) armored access way. This way, the Cmt Bda Bld is restricted to employ the balanced FT Bld when deciding on this integration. As for ground military doctrine, the incorporation of anti-tank missiles to the EB’s OM will demand the updating of the fire support planning of the GU, due to the added capabilities, mainly in defensive operations, such as in the areas of engagement, retrograde movements and defense in position.
Among these capabilities, the Standoff stands out in relation to most of the CBMVs currently employed. In the same way, it is verified that there is currently no armored protection solution that counteracts engagement through high trajectory obtained by the “top attack” firing mode.
- CASE STUDY: THE WAR IN UKRAINE
The Third Generation FGM-148 Javelin, or Advanced Anti-Tank Weapon System-Medium (AAWS-M), produced by the US defense firm Raytheon & Lockeheed Martin, was developed in the 1980s by the US as a useful tool in combating the armored vehicles that were rapidly developing on the international stage.
With the decline of high-intensity armed conflicts in the world at the end of the 20th century, this weapon had never been put into actual employment on such a large scale as now. If we look at the last “direct” conflict between the East and West sides of the Iron Curtain, still during the Cold War, we will see that AC means were not then able to play a predominant role at the strategic level as they do now, much due to their technology and high value.
The landscape has since changed thanks to the features introduced on the Ukrainian battlefield by modern AC weapon systems, in particular the Javelin. Its “Fire and Forget” firing mode, integrated into its Launching Unit, provides the shooter with the possibility of locking on to the target in the aiming system integrated into the ammunition, firing, and immediately evading from the position, seeking a mute position and thus making it difficult for the enemy to locate and fire on him, unlike the previous generation of AC weapons, such as the M47 Dragon, which required guiding the ammunition until its impact with the target, which was usually in motion.
Also, unlike most AC weapons, the Javelin’s missile trajectory is parabolic. The firing mechanism is already pointed toward the target with an inclination of about 15 degrees, allowing the ammunition to rise and then fall. This feature allows the target to be hit from above, on the top of the body or tower, where the armor is usually lighter and not protected by the explosive modules of the reactive armor.
Furthermore, when leaving the launch tube, the missile starts its propulsion about three meters ahead of the shooter. This characteristic reduces the “blast area” behind the weapon, allowing the shooter to fire from inside a building, for example. This shows how the Javelin combines lethality with flexibility, making it an exceptional combat tool in the modern scenario.
In addition, according to the site Defesa Net, three other characteristics give the Javelin the status of “State of the Art” in AC defense: its extreme ease of handling, the possibility of reusing the Launch Unit for new shots, and the ability to use this unit for monitoring the battlefield with its optronic means.
First, we can see how the Javelin was quickly incorporated by the Ukrainian Army and deployed efficiently. Much of this is due to the easy handling of the material, whose graphical interface is very similar to that of a video game or any other gadget we are used to using in our daily lives. The GPS control system allows for effective target lock and accurate shooting, without the need for additional calculations on the shooter’s part.
Secondly, the reusability of the Launch Unit, coupled with its relatively light weight of only 23 kg – which allows the weapon to be fired from the shooter’s shoulder, rather than using a tripod or other support – gives the Javelin greater ease of transport and resupply in the higher echelons.
We can also note the extremely useful feature of the Launch Unit in monitoring the combat zone. Its integrated GPS, infrared camera, and motorized zoom enable the AC gun’s garrison to monitor Regions for Intelligence Interest (RIPI), action zones, or any area of interest within its useful range of about 2000m, even after the garrison has exhausted its ammunition.
Despite being in the spotlight of both the world media and the armed forces themselves involved in the conflict at hand, the Javelin still relies on some “adjunct” AC weapon systems in the combat scenario.
Much of this is due to the high monetary cost tied to this versatile weaponry: according to ANGELIS (2013), some models can cost as much as $178,000.00 and each replacement missile an average of $8000.00.
For this reason, according to AXE (2022), the Ukrainian army uses a “mix” of AC weapons, employing among its military, also, the Stugna-P, manufactured by the Luch Design Bureau, from Ukraine, the Swedish Carl Gustav M4, AT-4 (whose price varies around US$1500.00) and NLAW, the CORSAR, also Ukrainian, and the Israeli Trophy System, this in turn, integrated into armored vehicles as a form of active AC defense.
All of these weapons have significantly lower production costs, which makes them easy for NATO countries to acquire and send to Ukraine. As a result, it is common to see in DAC actions by defenders in the Ukrainian War that the Javelin are used against armored vehicles with greater combat power, or that they fire more “difficult” shots more accurately, while the other weapons are fired at the rest of the convoys, which at this point may be stopped on a narrow road or on a street in a built-up area surrounded by buildings.
- CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Ukrainian War is the first high-intensity conflict of the 21st century that affected the planet on a large scale, employing means and mobilizing countries on a global scale. However, as recently as 2006, during the Lebanon War between Hezbollah and Israel, Israel suffered a harsh lesson, as the Islamic organization was able to shrewdly prepare and employ its AC means and inflict heavy casualties on the Israelis.
In the tactical arena, Hezbollah proved to be a worthy adversary for IDF ground forces. Their use of ATGMs and RPGs against Israeli tanks was cunning and inventive. Of the 114 IDF servicemen killed during the war, 30 were tank crews. Of the 400 tanks involved in the fighting in southern Lebanon, 48 were hit, 40 were damaged, and 20 penetrated.
Five Merkavas are believed to have been completely destroyed. Clearly, Hezbollah has mastered the art of light infantry / ATGM tactics against heavy mechanized forces. Hezbollah also deserves high marks for its innovative use of sophisticated ambushes and the clever use of direct and indirect fire.(MATTHEWS, 2012, p.64)
Just as the advent of “war tanks” in the European theater of operations in World War I forever changed the way war is waged and armies are organized around the world, what was seen in Lebanon in 2006, as Matthews tells us, served as a prelude to what was to occur in the Ukraine War, the technological advancement of AC weapons is showing the world that the combat power imposed by a nation endowed with a vast armored fleet, once absolute and hopelessly decisive, now lies contained by the judicious employment of DAC techniques.
Although weapons that could combat armored vehicles are almost as old as the vehicles themselves, the development of the lethal power of today’s AC weapon systems in the 1980s and 1990s and the first two decades of this century has supplanted the development of the armored vehicles themselves, tipping the balance in favor of armored vehicles.
The employment of small light infantry fractions, armed with the Javelin, granted back great importance to troops of this nature in open field combat. Moreover, several operational benefits were gained by Ukraine in the conflict with the proper employment of the Javelin and its other means of DAC, such as the possibility of prolonging the conflict, making it difficult for the invading country to achieve a quick victory by employing its armored means – according to KINGTON (2008), Russia reported that it lost more than 600 armored vehicles in the first three months of combat; the imposition on the Russian army to change its modus operandi in Offensive Operations, making them more cautious in the use of their armored means; and the psychological impact on enemy armored troops, cooling their readiness for combat and, consequently, their operational capacity.
Thus, we see how this conflict is slowly changing some paradigms of modern conflicts, bringing to the surface new questions about the doctrine of employing armored troops and, above all, about the need to develop new types of armored vehicles that can again be an unquestionable decisive factor in the battlefields of the 21st century.
The Brazilian Army’s campaign manual C 7-32 – Anti-Armed Platoon is dated 1978, and mentions technical characteristics of a missile already out of use by the Brazilian Army, demanding technical and tactical updates. The premise should be that an anti-tank weapon is, by definition, a capability that denies the enemy free use of access routes, therefore a defensive capability.
Aiming to explore these concepts, in 2020 the symposium “Anti-Carry Subunit” was held, an activity foreseen in the Land Military Doctrine Development Plan 2020 (PDDMT-2020) of the Land Operations Command, under the coordination of the Southern Military Command.
At this point, it was defined that the Light Brigades (Motorized, Aeromobile, Mountain, Jungle, and Paratroopers) each have a different type of infiltration, and the SU AC must consider its employment after infiltration, whether by means of fixed or rotary wing aircraft, boats, parachutes, etc.
As for the Medium Brigades (Mechanized Infantry and Mechanized Cavalry), although they have their own constitutions and different employment priorities, considering the main mission of anti-tank fire support assigned to the SU AC, they will have the same organizational structure, that is, 02 (two) Anti-tank Missile Platoons equipped with anti-tank missiles and 02 (two) Anti-tank Platoons equipped with 8X8 AC VBC with Can 105 mm or higher caliber.
The Brazilian Army’s campaign manual C 7-32 – Anti-tanker Platoon is dated 1978 and mentions technical characteristics of a missile already out of use by the Brazilian Army, demanding technical and tactical updates. The premise should be that an anti-tank weapon is, by definition, a capability that denies the enemy free use of access routes, therefore a defensive capability.
Aiming to explore these concepts, in 2020 the symposium “Anti-Carry Subunit” was held, an activity foreseen in the Land Military Doctrine Development Plan 2020 (PDDMT-2020) of the Land Operations Command, under the coordination of the Southern Military Command.
At this point, it was defined that the Light Brigades (Motorized, Aeromobile, Mountain, Jungle, and Paratroopers) each have a different type of infiltration, and the SU AC must consider its employment after infiltration, whether by means of fixed or rotary wing aircraft, boats, parachutes, etc.
As for the Medium Brigades (Mechanized Infantry and Mechanized Cavalry), although they have their own constitutions and different employment priorities, considering the main mission of anti-tank fire support assigned to the SU AC, they will have the same organizational structure, that is, 02 (two) Anti-tank Missile Platoons equipped with anti-tank missiles and 02 (two) Anti-tank Platoons equipped with 8X8 AC VBC with Can 105 mm or higher caliber.
Still during the symposium, it was defined that the SU AC will have an Observation and Surveillance Group, composed of a Ground Surveillance Class (Tu Vig Ter) and two Remotely Piloted Aircraft Classes (Tu ARP).
As for the armaments of the Medium Bda’s Pel AC, the Msl AC are, conceptually, essentially defensive weapons, and, complementarily, the cannon of the VBC AC is more suitable for offensive actions.
Given this, the cannon is a more effective weapon than the Msl AC in high mobility actions (within its useful range), due to its greater rate of fire and the possibility of firing on the move.
Having said this, the Brazilian Army’s capabilities regarding ACD means, we verify that this is an operational capability that can be increased with the acquisition of weapon systems such as the Javelin or its Israeli counterpart, the SPIKE LR, which is strongly recommended.
In view of this, in the year 2021, the Army carried out the acquisition of Msl AC SPIKE LR2 systems from the Israeli Company RAFAEL DEFENSE, with a schedule for receiving this SMEM established in a specific Directive from the 4th SCh/EME, dated 30 AUG 22. By analyzing the Brazilian strategic environment, we verify that some countries have armored means in considerable quantity and quality, which brings to light the debate on the subject.
Below is a comparative table showing the quantity and year of acquisition of AC missiles by Latin American countries, according to the Stockholme International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI):
The data cited in Table 1 bring alert to the lag in the AC means acquired by Brazil and arouse the need to seek to reduce the great distance that exists today between our country and its neighbors. However, if due attention is paid to the issue, the “Game of War” of this potential armed conflict may be balanced – contrary to what happens today – in the confrontation between “Armored Means x DAC”.
Then, as we see happening today in Ukraine, we could stand up to an opponent force endowed with outstanding armored assets and gain significant advantage in a potential state of belligerency.
REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS
ANGELIS, Diana. Opções Reais na Aquisição do Sistema Militar: O Estudo de Caso de Desenvolvimento de Tecnologia para o Sistema Javelin Anti-Tanque de Armas. 2013. 22 p. Programa de Pesquisa de Aquisição. Escola de Pós-Graduação em Negócios e Políticas Públicas, Escola de Pós-Graduação Naval. Monterey, Califórnia, EUA. 2013.
AXE, David. Para derrubar tanques russos e sobreviver, os mísseis ucranianos aprenderam a atirar e a se escovar. Forbes. 2022. Disponível em: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/04/02/to-knock-out-russian- tanques – e sobrevivam – mísseis ucranianos – aprenderam a atirar – e scoot/?sh=1093812cb51c. Acesso em: 27 de Setembro de 2022.
DEFESANET. Javelin: a arma antitanque símbolo da resistência ucraniana. DEFESANET. 2022. Disponível em: https://www.defesanet.com.br/us_ru_otan/noticia/43948/Javelin–a-arma antitanque -simbolo-da-resistência-ucraniana/. Acesso em: 26 de Setembro de 2022.
MATTHEWS, Matt M. Fomos Apanhados Sem Preparo. 1 Ed. Washington, DC, EUA. Escritório de Impressão do Governo dos EUA, 2012.
KINGTON, Tom. As lições da Ucrânia podem ajudar a moldar o novo tanque da Europa – se é que existe um. Notícias da Defesa. 2022. Disponível em: https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/06/13/lessons-from-ukraine- could-help-shape-europes-new-tank-if-there-is-one/. Acesso em: 27 de Setembro de 2022.
*** Translated by the DEFCONPress FYI TEAM ***